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The Utility of Multiple Peril Crop
Insurance for Irrigated,
Multiple-Crop Agriculture
K. D.  Zering, C. O. McCorkle, Jr., and C. V.  Moore
The usefulness  of FCIC multiple  peril crop  insurance on diversified,  irrigated,  high-
yielding farms in the Imperial Valley is examined. Production data and expected price
and yield distributions  were collected from thirty-two farm managers  in 1982.
Individual whole-farm  net income distributions then were used to elicit their risk
preferences.  Participation  in FCIC crop insurance  for cotton,  wheat, and sugar beets
under the existing program and under several alternatives  was predicted.  Predicted
participation  never exceeds  25% of eligible growers.  Low maximum yield guarantees
and premiums inconsistent with individual  yield experience are identified as factors
limiting participation.
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Can  a crop  insurance  program  originally  de-
signed  for dryland  wheat production  in  1938
provide  coverage  for  a broad  range of crops
produced  under  widely  varying  conditions
across  the  United States  now? This  question
arose from the Federal Crop Insurance Act of
1980,  which authorized  the Federal  Crop  In-
surance  Corporation  (FCIC)  to provide mul-
tiple-peril  crop  insurance  for  more  crops  in
more counties in conjunction with the phase-
out of the Disaster Payments  Program (DPP).
The DPP had been providing crop  insurance
at  no additional  cost  to farm  operators  who
participated  in the  nonrecourse  loan and set-
aside programs.
FCIC has had a history of low participation.
Only 16% of potential acreage  (excluding PIK
acres)  was  insured  or  reinsured  by  FCIC  as
recently as 1983 (AACI). Only 8% of U.S. har-
vested acreage  was insured  in  1980  (Kramer
1982). Participating  acreage increased by 81%
(U.S. GAO) in 1981,  mainly from  expansion
K. D. Zering is an assistant professor,  Department of Economics
and Business,  North  Carolina State  University;  C.  O.  McCorkle
is a professor,  Department of Agricultural  Economics,  University
of California, Davis; C. V. Moore  is Director, Research and Plan-
ning, Rice  Growers Association  of California,  Sacramento.
This is Giannini Foundation Paper No. 802.
The authors  appreciate  the  comments  and  suggestions  of the
reviewers.
to  replace the DPP.  Previous studies indicate
that FCIC crop insurance can be an attractive
risk-management  option  for  risk-averse  dry-
land  monoculture  farmers  (King and  Oamek
1981,  1983;  Kramer  1981).  This  study  ad-
dresses the current and potential value of mul-
tiple-peril  crop  insurance  as  a  risk-manage-
ment  tool  to  farm  operators  in  irrigated,
multiple-crop  agriculture.  This  study  exam-
ines limitations to broader participation in the
current FCIC crop insurance program and pro-
poses  some changes  to  allow  expanded  use-
fulness of the FCIC program.
The Study Area and 1982 Insurance
Alternatives
The study was conducted in the Imperial Val-
ley of California, where 460,000 acres of land
are under  cultivation.  All crops  are irrigated,
and production continues throughout the year.
A variety of crops including alfalfa, wheat, cot-
ton,  sugar beets,  and  a  number  of vegetable
crops  are produced there,  giving farm opera-
tors ample opportunity  to diversify.  Mean as
well  as variance  of yields  are high relative to
other areas in the country (see table  1).
The  1982  FCIC crop insurance  program in
the Imperial Valley consisted of two methods
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of calculating yield guarantees and premiums.
Under the Area Coverage  Program, operators
could  select yield guarantees  of 50%,  65%, or
75% of the average yield assigned to their farm
by  FCIC.  FCIC  calculated  average  yield  for
each  farm  by adjusting historical  county-av-
erage yields for soil type. Premiums were based
on expected indemnity for the county adjusted
for soil type. Individual operators could have
their premiums  reduced by up to 50%  or in-
creased by up to 300% by buying FCIC  crop
insurance  over several years and incurring no
indemnifiable losses or frequent, large indem-
nifiable  losses,  respectively.  Area  coverage
premiums  ranged  from $10.30  to $39.45  per
acre for  cotton,  $2.15  to $10.30  per  acre  for
wheat,  and $2.70 to $26.50  per acre for sugar
beets.
Individual  Yield  Coverage  (IYC)  was  the
second method of calculating FCIC yield guar-
antees and premiums in 1982. Operators could
submit proof of yields  in the  five  years  prior
to  1982 to establish an average yield for their
farm. Operators  could select  yield guarantees
of 50%,  65%,  or 75%  of their average  yields.
Premiums were calculated by multiplying the
guaranteed  yield  times  the  price  election  by
FCIC's premium rate for the individual farm.
FCIC's premium rate under IYC was based on
the  yield guarantee  classification  of the indi-
vidual  farm  under  the  Area  Coverage  Pro-
gram.
The operator could select one of three price
elections  under both  the Area  Coverage  and
IYC programs.  The highest  price election  of-
fered by FCIC was intended to be at least 90%
of expected  market  price.  For  example,  the
three price  elections for  cotton in  1982  were
$.50, $.65,  and $.75 per pound.
A  government  subsidy  allowed  operators
who  chose not to  participate  in the  Disaster
Payment Program to have premiums  reduced
by 30% in  1982 on crop insurance  with yield
guarantees of 50% or 65% of  their average yield.
The subsidy reduced the premium on the 75%
yield guarantee by a cash amount equal to the




A stratified random sample of Imperial Valley
growers of insurable  crops was  selected  from
several farm  size strata.  Farms in the sample
ranged from 130 to 9,500 acres in size. Thirty-
two Imperial Valley growers were interviewed
during the summer of 1982 to obtain detailed
data on production  practices,  price and yield
expectations  for the  1982-83  crop  year,  and
farm firm characteristics.
Price and yield  expectations  for the  1982-
83 crop year were elicited by asking producers
to  distribute  ten  equally  probable  outcomes
across  a range  of yields (e.g.,  fig.  1) or prices
according to their expectations.  The range  of
possible  yields  or  prices  and  the "width"  of
categories within the range were based on prior
evaluation  of the  questionnaire  by  Imperial
Valley producers.'  The probability elicitation
method  selected  falls into the nonmotivating
classification  (e.g.,  Bessler  1984)  because  no
monetary  or  other  motivation  was  given  to
producers to provide accurate subjective prob-
ability distributions.2
Elicited  probability  distributions  of prices
and yields  are summarized in table 2.  Ceteris
paribus,  larger variance and more negative third
moments of the elicited yield distributions  are
expected to increase  the value  of crop  insur-
ance.
Second Interview
In the summer of 1983, a modified version of
King and  Robison's  interval approach  to the
measurement  of decision  maker  preferences
was used to elicit risk preferences from thirty
of the operators in the sample. The assumption
of constant  bands  of absolute  risk  aversion
across the whole range of net income allowed
use of whole-farm net income distributions in
elicitation  of risk preferences.  This modifica-
tion allowed  the choices  presented to the op-
erator  to  be  more  realistic.  Whole-farm  net
income  distributions  were  collapsed from
twenty to six observations to allow ease of ex-
amination  by operators.3
Ten  equally  probable  outcomes  generally  were adequate  for
producers to describe distributions, although they occasionally left
gaps in a distribution to include outlying prices or yield outcomes.
2 The  lack  of resources  to provide  substantial  payoffs  and  the
large amount of producers'  time required for the other parts of the
questionnaire were reasons for not selecting the proper scoring rule
approach.  Producers may or may not have been motivated by the
knowledge  that the accuracy  of enterprise  and farm  net income
and risk analysis subsequently provided  to them depended on the
accuracy of the probability  distributions they provided.
3 The definition and derivation  of the  whole-farm net  income
distributions  appear in following  sections.
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Table  1.  A Comparison of Average  Yield  Statistics  for Imperial County  and Selected  States
for Cotton, Sugar Beets,  and Wheat for the period 1974-78
Standard
Deviation  of
Five-Year  Annual  Coefficient  Value  of One  Value of
Average  Average  of  25% of  Standard  25%  of
Crop and Place  Yield  Yields  Variationa  Mean Yield  Deviationb  Mean Yieldb
Cotton (500 lb.  bales/acre)  ----------.--------------------. ($)  ----------------------------------
Imperial County  2.03  .47  .23  .57  175.50  190.05
California  1.90  .32  .17  .48  119.60  177.97
Mississippi  .97  .15  .15  .24  57.30  90.75
Texas  .65  .10  .15  .16  37.70  60.60
Sugar beets (tons/acre)
Imperial County  24.80  1.69  .07  6.20  58.98  217.00
California  26.48  1.38  .05  6.62  48.42  231.70
Colorado  18.40  .80  .04  4.60  27.91  161.00
Wheat (tons/acre)
Imperial County  2.48  .152  .06  .619  22.87  92.93
California  1.79  .150  .08  .449  22.50  67.28
Colorado  .684  .036  .05  .171  5.44  25.65
Kansas  .870  .029  .03  .218  4.27  32.62
Texas  .636  .092  .14  .159  13.77  23.85
Sources: Imperial  County yield statistics are calculated from data in "Imperial County Agriculture,"  from the Office of the Agricultural
Commissioner,  El  Centro, California,  1979.  Selected  states' statistics are calculated from data found in USDA Crop Reporting Board.
Note:  Individual farms may have  experienced higher or  lower  mean yields  and standard  deviations  than are  suggested by  aggregate
averages.  Similarly, aggregation over greater acreage tends to result in variance of state-average yields being less than variance  of  county-
average yields.
a Coefficient of variation is calculated  as standard  deviation divided by average  yield.
b Values  are calculated with the following prices:  cotton, $375 per 500  lb. bale; sugar beets, $35  per ton;  wheat $150 per ton.
Efficient  strategies in various  risk aversion
categories that satisfied the following criterion
were  selected  for  use  in  the risk-preference-
elicitation procedure:
Strategies  1,  2,  3,  ... ,  n  were  considered
suitable  for risk preference  elicitation if
E[Ui=K]  >  max(E[UiK])  if RLK  < RK(Y)  < RUK
for ally  i=  ,2  ... , n
RU(K-1)  <  RLK  <  RUK  <  RL(K+I),
where  E[  U] is  expected  utility  of strategy  i,
RLK and RUK are the lower  and upper  bounds
on the  absolute  risk aversion  coefficients  de-
fining  risk aversion  category  K,  and RKY)  is
the  absolute risk aversion  function of net in-
come (Y) for any decision maker in risk aver-
sion category  K.
For any set of strategies i = 1, 2,..., n such
as that defined above,  preference  for strategy
i = K was taken as indication that the opera-
tor's  absolute risk aversion  coefficient  took a
value between RU(K-  ) and RL(K+  ) for all levels
of net income simulated for his farm. It is pos-
sible that both strategy  i = K and  strategy i =
K - 1 are efficient for operators with risk aver-
sion  coefficients  that lie  between  RU(K-1) and
RLK.  Therefore,  preference  for strategy  i = K
cannot be taken as evidence that the operator's
risk  aversion  coefficient  clearly  exceeds  RLK,
but that it does exceed  RU(K- 1)
Each strategy selected for the elicitation pro-
cedure was printed on a separate card for pre-
sentation  to operators.  The  six equally prob-
able net income results as  well  as their mean
and  standard deviation  were  printed on  one
side of the card.4 The acreage  of each crop and
the level  of FCIC crop  insurance  on each  in-
surable crop  were printed on the back of the
card. Operators  were allowed to look at both
sides of the card and asked to select the strategy
that  they  preferred  for their farms.  The  op-
portunity to associate crop mix and insurance
4A question  has arisen  as to  whether  producers  used  the  six
equally probable outcomes to evaluate the net income distribution
(as is intended  in the interval method) or just the mean and stan-
dard deviation. Our reasoning was that the sample mean and stan-
dard  deviation  were  simply  summary  statistics  of the  six  data
points already presented on the cards. If producers  chose to ignore
the additional information provided and selected a strategy  solely
on  a  mean-variance  criterion,  the  elicitation  method  remained
valid. In  practice,  producers  tended  to focus  on  the  six  equally
probable  outcomes and the  mean when  discussing their alterna-
tives.
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Cotton Prices  and Yields
Indicate what you believe are the chances of different cotton lint yields occurring on your fields in  1982
(bales/acre).
1  1.5  2  2.5  3  3.5  4  4.5  5
Indicate what you believe  are the chances  of different  cotton  lint prices being received  by you in  1982
($lb.).
.50-.55  .55-.60  .60-.65  .65-.70  .70-.75  .75-.80  .80-.85  .85-.90  .90-.95  .95-1.00
Figure 1.  An example  of the format used to elicit probability distributions of prices and yields
from Imperial Valley  producers
strategy  directly  with  the  whole-farm  net in-
come distribution was well received  by most
operators  in the  sample.  This feature  of the
elicitation procedure made identified risk pref-
erences  more  realistic  to the extent  that op-
erators discussed options in the context of  their
own farming situations.  Operators'  interest in
the relationship between various strategies and
the probability distribution of whole-farm net
income indicates a strong potential for devel-
opment  of farm-level  risk  management  and
teaching aids.
Risk  preferences  of thirty  producers  were
elicited with stochastically efficient whole-farm
net income distributions. Seventeen producers
were classified as risk averse while thirteen were
risk neutral. Absolute risk aversion coefficients
ranged  in  scale  from  .0000002 to  .0001.  By
comparison, King and Oamek (1983) reported
absolute  risk  aversion  coefficients  ranging  in
scale from .00001 to .00007 using their inter-
val  method.  The  magnitude  of absolute  risk
aversion coefficients  tended to decrease as the
magnitude of the whole-farm net income  dis-
tribution increased.
Costs and Net Income
The University of California  Budget Genera-
tor was used to estimate cost of production per
acre based on elicited production practices for
each crop grown by each grower in the sample.
The  measure  used  in  comparing  alternative
strategies was net income after cash costs. The
term "net income"  refers to net income after
cash costs which excludes the opportunity cost
of unpaid labor and equity financed  assets.
Estimated cash costs include per acre costs
and yield-dependent  costs that affect  both the
mean and  the shape  of the calculated  net in-
come  distribution.  Interest  and  depreciation
on owned machinery and equipment and rent
on land owned by the operator were multiplied
by  the  operator's  debt-to-asset  ratio  to  esti-
mate their cash cost. Higher per acre cash costs
tend to reduce mean net income for a crop but
do  not affect  the  shape  of the income  distri-
bution;  higher yield-dependent  cash costs re-
duce the mean and affect the shape  of the in-
come distribution according to the relationship
of yield  and gross  income;  and  higher  share
rent reduces both the mean and the dispersion
of the net income distribution.
Efficient Crop Mix and Insurance
Strategies
A modified version of King's generalized risk
efficient monte-carlo programming (GREMP)
model was used to identify risk-efficient  crop
mix and crop insurance  coverage  strategies in
several ranges of absolute risk aversion for each
operator. The level of crop insurance coverage
on each insurable crop and the number of acres
of each crop to be produced were stochastically
generated.  Acres of each crop were selected in
increments  of minimum  field  size  for  each
farm.  Crop  insurance  coverage  was  selected
from the nine possible  combinations  of price
elections and yield guarantees or no insurance
for each insurable crop. Total acres of all crops
on  a  farm  and  acres  of selected  crops  were
constrained to reflect actual total acres farmed
in 1982 and certain biological and market con-
straints.
The GREMP  model  employs  Meyer's  sto-
chastic dominance with respect  to a function
efficiency  criterion to rank alternative  strate-
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Table  2.  Sample  Mean Values  for the Mean  and Second,  Third, and Fourth Moments  About
the Mean of Elicited  Probability Distributions for the 1982-83  Crop Year
Number
in
Variable  Sample  Mean  Variance  Third Moment  Fourth Moment
Alfalfa  hay prices  18  80.47  49.85  -74.17  9,342
Alfalfa hay yields  18  8.38  .49  -. 08  1.18
Alfalfa  seed prices  2  97.15  122  -115  48,393
Alfalfa  seed yields  2  3.6  .93  -. 50  1.78
Cotton prices  23  363  498  413  907,498
Cotton yields  24  3.09  .28  -. 065  .329
Lettuce  prices  2  6.02  5.55  32.29  276
Lettuce  yields  2  666  8,556  -1,531,391  450,221,024
Sugar beet prices  10  39.9  39.85  97.012  8,492
Sugar beet  yields  13  27.1  5.33  -9.75  148.15
Wheat prices  27  132.13  106  870  74,600
Wheat yields  27  3.04  .11  -. 03  .076
gies according to their net income probability
distributions.  Efficiency  criteria  identify  effi-
cient sets of strategies  so that more than  one
strategy may be efficient for a decision maker.
According  to Meyer's  criterion,  a strategy  is
efficient for operators with absolute risk aver-
sion coefficients that lie within specified bounds
if  no other strategy considered provides greater
expected utility for all possible utility functions
within the specified bounds. 5
The  modified GREMP  model  was used to
identify efficient  strategies in the risk aversion
category containing the operator's elicited risk
preferences.  An  operator  was  predicted  as
"should  buy"  crop  insurance  if all  efficient
strategies in his risk aversion category include
crop  insurance.  If an  operator's  efficient  set
included  some  strategies  with  crop insurance
and others without, he was predicted  as "may
buy." Finally,  if no efficient strategy included
crop insurance,  the operator was predicted as
"should not" purchase  crop insurance.
A substantial modification was made to the
GREMP program to allow less expensive anal-
ysis  of  multiple-crop  farms.  An  important
characteristic of multiple-crop farms is the in-
terrelationship between prices and yields of the
various  crops.  A  twenty-observation  joint
probability distribution of prices and yields for
each operator in the sample was used to eval-
uate alternative  strategies instead  of the ran-
5  The absolute risk aversion functions  that define the bounds of
each  risk preference  category were  assumed  constant  across  all
levels of net income in this study. This assumption  was made to
facilitate the risk preference elicitation procedure described above.
Some flexibility in specification of  risk preferences is lost as a result.
domly selected set of prices and yields that the
GREMP  model's  generalized  multivariate
process generator would have produced.
The joint price and yield probability distri-
butions were constructed  from historical data
on county-average  prices and yields and from
the  probability  distributions  for  prices  and
yields elicited from each operator in the sam-
ple.  Following Bessler  (1977),  autoregressive
integrated  moving-average  (ARIMA)  models
were estimated for the price and yield of each
crop using twenty years of county-average data.
The  deviations  from the best-fitting  ARIMA
models  were  assumed  to represent  unantici-
pated fluctuations in prices and yields.6 It was
assumed that the  lowest yield  (price) in each
operator's elicited probability distribution oc-
curred in the year that the largest negative un-
anticipated fluctuation in county-average  yields
(prices) occurred.  Similarly, each  successively
higher yield (price) in the elicited distribution
was assigned to the year in which the next most
negative  deviation  occurred.  These  assump-
tions allow  construction  of a joint price  and
yield probability  distribution  which incorpo-
rates  interdependence  information  from  ob-
servation  of the past twenty  years while  pre-
serving the marginal probability  distributions
of prices  and yields  elicited from  individual
operators  for the current crop year.
This method of calculating interdependence
of forecasted prices and yields resulted in dif-
ferent  covariances  for each  operator.  All  but
6 Lin estimated enterprise  income interdependence  using a sim-
ilar method.
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five of twenty-four cotton producers had neg-
ative  covariances  between  cotton prices  and
yields. All eighteen alfalfa hay producers,  thir-
teen  sugar beet  producers,  and  twenty-seven
wheat producers had positive covariances be-
tween  prices  and yields  for those  crops.  One
of two alfalfa  seed producers  and one of two
lettuce growers had positive covariances, while
the others had negative covariances. Negative
covariance  of prices and yields is expected to
reduce the value of crop insurance for that crop
for a risk averter.
The combined data from elicited probability
distributions, estimated costs, and interdepen-
dence relationships results in a probability dis-
tribution of net income for each crop for each
producer (table  3).  Some  sampled  producers
of each  crop,  except lettuce  and alfalfa  seed,
had negative mean net income after cash costs
on owned and rented land.
Interdependence  of net income from differ-
ent crops  is  also  implicit  in this model.  Net
income per acre  of cotton was positively cor-
related with net income per acre of sugar beets,
alfalfa hay, and alfalfa seed but negatively cor-
related  with  net  income  from  lettuce  for  all
cotton  producers  in the  sample.  Net  income
from  cotton  was  positively  correlated  with
wheat  income  for  twelve  producers.  Net  in-
come from sugar beets, wheat, and alfalfa hay
tended to be positively correlated.  Positive co-
variances  of net  income  between  crops  are
thought  to reduce  the  effectiveness  of diver-
sification  as  a method  of reducing  risk.  The
relationship  between  diversification  and  pre-




An insurance option is described by the meth-
od of calculating yield guarantee and premium.
Three methods of calculating yield guarantees
were used in this study:
(A) The yield guarantee offered to operators
under FCIC's actual  1982 Area Coverage Pro-
gram was used to evaluate participation under
that  existing  program.  Area  Coverage  yield
guarantees  generally  are  based on county-av-
erage yields adjusted for soil types.
(B) Yield guarantees were  calculated  as the
selected percent coverage  (50%, 65%, or 75%)
times the mean  of yield  probability  distribu-
tions elicited from  each  producer.  This  yield
guarantee  was  used to  simulate  producer  in-
surance decisions when the average yield used
by FCIC to establish yield guarantees  exactly
equalled producers' expected yield. Yield guar-
antees  based on  the mean  of producers'  his-
torical yields were approximated under FCIC's
Individual Yield Coverage (IYC) Program. The
IYC program has recently been  replaced with
Actual Production History (APH), which uses
up to ten years  of historical  yields  excluding
the highest and lowest to establish yield guar-
antees.  Producers'  yield  expectations  in  any
one year may vary from their yield history.
(C) Yield guarantees  were calculated as  1.1
times FCIC's actual Area Coverage yield guar-
antees to simulate  effects  of the  10%  increase
in yield guarantees offered in conjunction with
the  1983 PIK program.
Six  methods  of premium  calculation  were
used.
(1) The premiums  actually charged to pro-
ducers  under Area  Coverage  were  used  with
yield  guarantee  (A) above  to  predict partici-
pation under FCIC's Area Coverage  Program
in 1982 (option 1 for cotton and wheat in table
4). These premiums were also used with yield
guarantee  (C) to evaluate  participation  under
the PIK program (option 6 for cotton and op-
tion 3 for wheat).
(2)  Premiums  actually charged  under Area
Coverage in 1982 for specified yield guarantees
were  combined  with  yield  guarantee  (B)  to
evaluate  the  effect  of calculating  yield  guar-
antees from average yields equal to producers'
expected  yield  under  the current  Area  Cov-
erage Program (cotton option 3 and wheat op-.
tion  2 in table  4).  The  premium rate (dollar
per unit of  yield guaranteed) for coverage based
on producers' expected yields may differ from
the premium rate for coverage based on their
assigned area yield.
(3) Insurance premium rates  (percent) spec-
ified for each operator by FCIC in 1982 under
the IYC program were multiplied by the prod-
uct of the yield guarantee and the price election
to calculate premiums. This method combined
with yield guarantee  (B) was used to evaluate
participation  under  the  1982  IYC  program
when yield guarantees are consistent with pro-
ducers' yield expectations (option 2 for cotton
in table 4).
(4)  Actual  1982  Area  Coverage premiums
were multiplied by .7 to examine the effect of
the 30% subsidy offered by FCIC in 1982. The
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Table  3.  Sample Average  Estimated Mean and Variance of Net  Income  per Acre  after Cash
Costs  by Crop in 1982/83
Number in  Net Income per Rented  Acre  Net Income  per Owned Acre Number in
Crop  Sample  Mean  Variance  Mean  Variance
($)  ($)
Alfalfa  hay  19  80  5,581  184  6,904
Alfalfa  seed  2  46  8,030  121  9,855
Cotton  24  130  28,030  242  31,226
Lettuce  2  550  506,815  627  507,914
Sugar beets  13  112  32,365  205  40,188
Wheat  27  14  3,223  89  3,592
actual  subsidy was  between  19%  and 22% at
the  75%  yield  guarantee.  This  premium  was
combined with yield guarantee  (B) to examine
the effects  of a subsidy when yield guarantees
are  consistent  with  producers'  expectations
(option  4  for cotton and  wheat and option  1
for sugar beets in table 4).
(5) Premiums  were  also  calculated  as pre-
mium (4)  above multiplied  by .7 to examine
the  effects  of a  51%  subsidy  (1  - (.7)2)  on
participation (option 5 for cotton).
(6)  Premiums  were  calculated  as  expected
indemnity divided by .9 to examine the effects
of a .9 target loss  ratio on participation.  This
premium  combined  with yield  guarantee  (B)
was  used to predict  participation  when  both
yield guarantees and premiums were calculat-
ed  from  yield  distributions  identical  to  pro-
ducers' probability distributions of yields (cot-




The predicted number of buyers of FCIC crop
insurance  (table  4) is low for programs  avail-
able  in  1982  such  as  Area  Coverage  (cotton
and wheat option  1) and  IYC (cotton option
2).  Making  yield  guarantees  consistent  with
producers' yield expectations  resulted in little
or no increase in predicted number of buyers
under Area Coverage  (cotton option  3, wheat
option  2),  Area  Coverage  with  30%  subsidy
(cotton option  4,  sugar beet  option  1, wheat
option 4) or IYC (cotton option 2). Increasing
the subsidy to 51% from 30% had no effect on
the predicted number of buyers  of cotton in-
surance (cotton option 5). A flat  10%  increase
in yield guarantees  as stipulated under the PIK
program  doubled  the  number  of  predicted
buyers  of cotton  insurance  under  the  Area
Coverage  Program  (cotton option 6) but had
little  effect  for wheat  (wheat  option  3).  The
largest  predicted  number  of buyers  for  each
crop occurred when premiums were calculated
as  expected  indemnity  divided  by .9  (cotton
option 7, sugar beet option 2, wheat option 5).
These results are consistent with King and Oa-
mek (1981). Unlike that study, however, max-
imum  predicted  participation  in  this  study
never exceeds 25% of  cotton growers, 0% sugar
beet  growers,  and  18.5%  of wheat  growers.
Some insight into the cause  of these low pre-
dicted numbers  of buyers is gained by exam-
ining expected loss ratios.
Expected Loss Ratios
Expected  loss  ratios  were  determined  by  di-
viding the expected crop insurance indemnity
by the premium for each producer under each
of the FCIC programs simulated (table 5).  Ex-
pected loss ratios larger than  1.0 indicate that
FCIC may expect to  pay out more in indem-
nities than it receives in premiums. Converse-
ly,  expected loss  ratios  less than  1.0  indicate
that the producer  may expect to pay more  in
premiums  than will  be received  in indemni-
ties.  In  general,  subsidies  and  arbitrary  in-
creases in yield guarantees increase loss ratios.
Yield  guarantees  consistent  with  producers'
expected yields may also cause high expected
loss ratios (e.g., cotton option 3 versus option
1) when premiums do not reflect the produc-
er's  yield  distribution.  When  the producer's
yield distribution is used not only to calculate
yield guarantees but also to calculate expected
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Table  4.  Number  of Operators Predicted to  Purchase  FCIC Crop Insurance under Various
Methods of Yield  Guarantee and Premium Calculation
Predicted Number
of Operators
Crop and  Should
Option  Should  May  Not
Number  Yield  Guarantee  Premium  Buy  Buy  Buy
Cotton
1  A.  1982 actual area  coverage  1.  1982  actual area  coverage  1  1  22
2  B.  Mean of elicited  yields  3.  1982 actual IYC rates  2  0  22
3  B.  Mean of elicited  yields  2.  1982 area  coverage  premiums  1  1  22
4  B.  Mean of elicited  yields  4.  .7  x  1982 area  coverage  2  1  21
5  B.  Mean of elicited  yields  5.  .49  x  1982  area coverage  2  1  21
6  C.  110%  x  1982 area  coverage  1.  1982 actual area coverage  4  0  20
7  B.  Mean of elicited  yields  6.  Expected indemnity/.9  2  4  18
Sugar beets
1  B.  Mean of elicited yields  4.  .7  x  1982 area  coverage  0  0  13
2  B.  Mean of elicited yields  6.  Expected indemnity/.9  0  0  13
Wheat
1  A.  1982 actual  area coverage  1.  1982 actual area coverage  1  1  25
2  B.  Mean of elicited yields  2.  1982 area  coverage premiums  1  2  24
3  C.  110%  x  1982 area  coverage  1.  1982 actual area coverage  2  0  25
4  B.  Mean of elicited yields  4.  .7  x  1982  area coverage  1  3  23
5  B.  Mean of elicited yields  6.  Expected indemnity/.9  1  4  22
indemnity, premiums can be calculated which
meet  target  loss ratios  (e.g., cotton  option  7,
sugar  beet  option  2,  wheat  option  5).  This
method not only results in increased predicted
participation  but also results  in  an  aggregate
expected loss ratio  less than  1.0 for FCIC.
A  problem  still  exists,  however,  because
eleven of twenty-four  cotton growers,  twelve
Table 5.  Number  of Operators with Selected  Expected  Loss Ratios under Various Methods of
Yield  Guarantee and Premium Calculation
Crop and Crop and  Loss Ratioa
Option
Numberb  >1.0  .7-1.0  .5-.7  .3-.5  .1-.3  .01-.1  .0  Total
Cotton
1  1  1  0  3  0  1  18  24
2  2  2  0  0  6  3  11  24
3  3  1  0  1  6  2  11  24
4  4  0  1  3  4  1  11  24
5  4  0  2  5  2  0  11  24
6  3  0  1  1  3  1  15  24
7  0  13  0  0  0  0  11  24
Sugar  beets
1  0  0  0  1  0  0  12  13
2  0  1  0  0  0  0  12  13
Wheat
1  1  0  1  0  0  0  25  27
2  1  1  1  1  1  3  19  27
3  2  0  0  1  4  0  20  27
4  2  1  1  1  2  2  19  27
5  0  8  0  0  0  0  19  27
a  Expected loss ratio is defined  as expected indemnity  divided by the premium.
b See  table 4 for yield  guarantees and premiums associated with  each option number.
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of thirteen sugar beet growers, and nineteen of
twenty-seven wheat growers have expected loss
ratios  and  expected  indemnities  of zero.  Ex-
pected  indemnities of zero  result  when there
is no probability of yields occurring below the
yield guarantee.  While a probability of zero of
low yields may be impossible, examination of
actual yield  records  over the period  1978-81
for twenty-three  cotton growers  in the sample
reveals  that  eleven  of them  did not achieve
yields below 75% of their expected yield. Fur-
thermore,  nineteen producers did not achieve
yields less than 75% of their average yield cal-
culated  over that period.  The low probability
of indemnifiable loss  discourages purchase  of
crop insurance.  This is particularly  true when
premiums  that are  large  relative  to expected
indemnity  result  in expected  loss  ratios near
zero  for individual producers.
Characteristics  of Predicted
Buyers of Crop Insurance
Characteristics  of producers predicted to buy
crop insurance  were  compared  to sample  av-
erages to identify marketing opportunities  for
FCIC. There  is  some  evidence that diversifi-
cation substitutes for insurance.  All farms pre-
dicted to buy either cotton or wheat insurance
produced four crops or fewer.  The nine farms
with  five or more  crops were never predicted
to buy crop insurance.
There  is  also  evidence  that  the  insurance
programs considered do not attract larger farms.
All farms predicted to buy either wheat or cot-
ton insurance under 1982 FCIC programs were
less than  1,300  acres  in size;  the  sample  av-
erage was  1,925 acres.  When premiums  were
calculated  to set the expected loss ratio to .9,
the  average  size  of farms  predicted to insure
rose to 1,450 acres for cotton insurers and 1,600
acres  for wheat  insurers.  Smaller  producers'
yield distributions tended to have larger vari-
ances, making existing area coverage programs
more attractive  to them.  Smaller variance  of
average yields on larger farms is consistent with
some independence  between yields  on differ-
ent  fields  which  results  in  self-insurance
through geographic  diversification.
Three of five share-rent producers of cotton
in the sample  were predicted  to insure under
option  7.  Only  one of seven  share-rent  pro-
ducers of wheat were predicted to insure. Share
rent tends to reduce the effect of yield variation
on the operator's net income variation.  Share-
rent operators may use crop insurance to fur-
ther stabilize  net income  for crops  with  high
cash costs such as cotton.
Discussion
The IYC and APH options  alone  will not be
sufficient  to attract  more insurance  buyers if
premiums  are not also tailored  to individual
yield history to achieve more efficient expected
loss  ratios.  There  is  a  substantial  difference
between yield  distributions  elicited from  op-
erators and the average yield distributions used
by FCIC to calculate insurance premiums. The
IYC  and  APH  programs  allow  operators  to
submit proof of past yield performance  to ob-
tain higher  yield  guarantees.  Under  the IYC
program, premiums were increased in propor-
tion to the  yield guarantee  without  consider-
ation of the operator's actual history of indem-
nifiable yields. The APH program applies lower
premium  rates  as average yields  increase but
fails to consider the producer's past frequency
of  indemnifiable  losses  in  determining  pre-
miums.  Furthermore,  premium  adjustments
for FCIC insured producers with exceptionally
low or high frequency  of indemnifiable  losses
are being phased out in conjunction with APH.
If operators perceive premiums to be too high
relative to the yield risk that they perceive for
their farms,  they may never  buy  crop  insur-
ance.
The presence of substantial uninsurable yield
risk indicates  that the current crop  insurance
program  is  not  providing  an  effective  risk-
management tool for farmers in areas with high
average  yields. To expand crop insurance uti-
lization,  FCIC's  current  legislated maximum
yield guarantee  of 75%  of mean yield should
be amended.  High mean yields  in areas  such
as the Imperial Valley result in proportionately
higher value of the uninsurable  25%  of mean
yield. Consequently, substantial financial loss-
es can occur before any indemnity can be col-
lected. An examination of state-average yields
over the  period  1974-78  shows  that the un-
insurable  25%  of California  average  cotton
yields is equal in amount and value to 50% of
the Mississippi average cotton yield and 70%
of the  Texas average  cotton yield (U.S.  Crop
Reporting Board).
An alternative criterion for calculating max-
imum yield  guarantees is  to legislate  a mini-
mum deductible in dollar value or in absolute
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units of yield per acre. The amount of the min-
imum deductible  would limit the uninsurable
financial loss per acre regardless of mean yield.
Higher  yield  guarantees  could  lead  to  in-
creased  moral hazard,  i.e., increased incentive
to  achieve  low  yields  to  collect  indemnities.
Increased coinsurance in the form of a decrease
in  the  maximum  price  election  may  be  re-
quired. Higher yield guarantees would increase
the  probability  of operators  receiving  an  in-
demnity while increased coinsurance would al-
low  lower  premiums  and  reduce  indemnity
payments.
FCIC crop insurance can be an effective risk
management tool for farm operators across the
country.  Current  legislative  limits  on  yield
guarantees  restrict  participation  in the insur-
ance program in high-yielding, diversified areas
of the  country.  Our  simulation  suggests  that
the  current  move  by  FCIC  to  individualize
yield guarantees  must be accompanied  by in-
creased "tailoring"  of premiums to individual
historical  yield  performance  if new crop  in-
surance buyers  are to be attracted.
The  1980  Federal  Crop  Insurance  Act  re-
flected  general  government  policy to  replace
various disaster protection programs support-
ed by government appropriations with a more
self-supporting  program  of actuarially  sound
multiple-peril crop insurance. In order to pro-
vide an effective disaster protection alternative
to  farm  operators,  crop  insurance  must  be
available  with  yield  guarantees  large  enough
to afford  minimal  financial  protection.  Crop
insurance  also must be available  with premi-
ums  that  accurately  reflect  individual  opera-
tors'  expected  indemnity  so  that  crop  insur-
ance  is a feasible  purchase.
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